**Peace and Development: A Comparative Study of Rwanda and Somalia**

1Karuhanga Abia, 2Wanjiku Catheline, 3Cherwon Ivy, 4Ngeno Weldon, K

***Abstract:* This article seeks to analyze the correlation between conflict and development on a country and how this relation has consequences on the nation’s in question. The article will also highlight the progress Rwanda has taken to develop after the 1994 Genocide and how this progress has invited investments causing many to believe that there can actually be development and prosperity after such a travesty. On the other hand, Somalia a neighboring country that has known conflict for centuries that can be traced as far back to the early 1960’s is still undergoing conflict with in the state so much so that it has been considered a failed state in the region and also internationally. This article addresses the ways Somalia has potential to develop but is still having challenges.**

***Keywords:* Peace and Development.**

**1. INTRODUCTION**

The interconnection between conflict and underdevelopment in Africa has been realized for quite some time now. It has largely become difficult for anyone to speak of peace in the continent without the mention of development and vice versa. Peace keeping efforts by the United Nation in Africa has risen tremendously since the end of the cold war. In Africa from the late 1980s onwards was accompanied by a somber reality that saw some of the worst instances of violence and warfare occur in the wake of internationally brokered peace initiatives and agreements (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002). This goes to attest to the fact that conflicts in the continent has risen.

**2. THE LEADING CONCEPTS**

**Peace:**

At the core of understanding peace, is conflict. The common root causes of conflict are; poverty, injustice, discrimination, inequalities, domination etc. which often fuel rivalry among people, communities eventually affecting the governance of the affected nations. Peace as defined by Webster is a state of mutual concord between governments and absence of hostilities or war (Barash & Webel, 2009).

Conflict is defined as a situation in which actors use conflict behavior against each other to attain incompatible goals to express their hostility (Bartos & Wehr,2002). War can be defined as a direct violent encounter between two or more opposing parties with a view to gaining access to an object of their mutual interests. It is usually accompanied by the use of weapons such as guns, bows and arrows, machetes, sticks, biological weapons, and weapons of mass destruction. Clausewitz considers interstate war as a form coercive diplomacy in which what cannot achieved by force, be obtained through dialogue is achieved by force (Abimbola & Dominic, 2013). However, what is not known is that conflict is a constructive force in the human society, being natural in the process of change and development. At the outset, the most important recent change to note is that warfare has declined on the continent (Abrahamsen, 2013).

Conflicts constitute a major threat to African development in terms of loss of human life, destruction of property, displacement of people, sometimes across international borders and diversion of resources meant for promoting sustainable development into arms purchase and funding of expensive peace keeping (Francis, 2008) peace is a universal concept, every society desires it; none can exist without it. The most simplistic but popular understanding of peace is that it is the opposite of conflict or violence. Conflict significantly undermines the state, and frequently conflict affected states have been subject to years of misrule prior to the conflict. As such, a critical element of post conflict reconstruction is re-establishing the credibility and legitimacy of the state by including major stake holders in political, economic and social processes of recovery (Beswick & Jackson, 2015).

**Development:**

Development is a concept, that has confronted both the theoretical and political scale. Lately, it has taken on the limited meaning of aiming at reducing poverty. The two key characteristics of development are growth and capitalism. These relations are present in the global capital relocation where production is moved from developed nations to developing nations. Here, there is a monopoly of power as seen in the shift as addressed above. Development can be defined as higher living standards, a rising per capita income, increase in productive capacity, mastery over nature, freedom through control of man’s environment and economic growth (Payne & Phillips, 2010).

Many of these practices go back to the colonial times where colonies enjoyed benefits of acquiring raw materials together with labor at very minimal costs at the expense of those that were exploited. They benefited on Africa’s good and richness in a bid to develop their countries overseas. In Africa especially, the economic structures and management system was heavily inherited from the colonial powers and this negatively impacts on Africa’s inability to create her own policies on development. The rampant violence and conflicts in major parts of the continent has largely been due to a stumbling block to proper development.

However, a few countries have come out of worse conflicts and managed to positively battle the challenges and stay ahead of the game, Rwanda remains the best suiting example. After the gruesome 1994 genocide in the country that left close to one million innocent people dead, Rwanda’s image was tarnished globally and a lot of negative publicity was published around the country. Not so far after did the country come back up and picked up all its broken pieces, gradually fixing one after the other. Rwanda is considered one of the best developing nations in the region and continent.

**3. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF RWANDA AND SOMALIA**

***Rwanda:***

Rwanda was invaded in October 1990 by the Rwandan Patriotic Front(RPF)a rebel movement of Tutsi exiles in Uganda led by Paul Kagame marking the beginning of a full scale civil war in the country. Until the RPF invasion, post-colonial Rwanda had maintained a veneer of stability largely due to the exclusion of the Tutsi group from power and authoritarian control by the Hutu military establishment (Omeje & Hepner, 2013). Genocide is defined as a sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim. Genocide can also be defined as a form of one-sided mass killing in which the state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are identified by the perpetrator (Hintjens,1999). Motives behind genocide can be as varied as the context that produced them. One of the common motives often exhibited by genocide perpetrators is to destroy a group perceived to be a threat to the ruling power. All the Rwandans interviewed agreed on the fact that the Tutsis in exile had become a threat to the government of Juvenal Habyarimana and for him to consolidate his power, thereby perpetuating himself and the Hutu group in office, the Tutsis, therefore, had to give way by elimination. (Abimbola & Dominic, 2013). The goal was to liquidate Tutsi and any moderate Hutu who were seen as opposed to the Habyarimana government. The carnage resulted in the deaths of between five hundred thousand and one million men, women, and children (Newbury, 1995).

Rwanda before 1990 was empirically relatively strong, with the Hutu elite maintaining a high degree of control over the territory and population. The onset of civil war after the invasion of the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front challenged this dominance and the ensuing genocide could not have been executed so efficiently were it not for the strength and penetration of the Rwandan state in society (Beswick& Jackson, 2015). In addition to the normal chain of command through the army, police, administration, and militias, they used radio broadcasts to emit hate messages, encouraging Rwandans to kill fellow citizens. The horrific results testify in part to the penetration of state power in this society. In Rwanda, the "ethnic conflict" of 1994 was simply state-sponsored terrorism against its own citizens. The situation was rendered all the more volatile because of the history of ethnic conflict between Tutsi and Hutu, the numerical imbalance between them, the popular remembered histories highlighting antagonism along ethnic lines, and the association of ethnicity and power (Newbury, 1995).

By 1994, agricultural production was in severe crisis and food production had declined. As food imports rose and the currency was devalued, a trade gap emerged, with export revenue covering barely one third of the import bill. Food was in short supply, but with growing demand from the military, beer production increased. The devastating economic consequences of falling commodity prices IMF and World Bank policies were not confronted because of feared financial repercussions. The economic impact of genocide was immediately disastrous, killing started in the planting season, as a result the I 994 harvest was less than half its I 993 level. By June I 994, almost all the cattle in Rwanda were dead, replanting started almost at once after the genocide but farms were in ruins (Abimbola & Dominic, 2013). The world price of coffee, Rwanda's main export, showed worrisome price fluctuations towards the end of the 1980s, and in the summer of 1989 the price plummeted by about 50 percent. The repercussions for rural dwellers were severe. Then in November 1990 Rwanda devalued the currency as part of a stabilization program mandated by the International Monetary Fund. Devaluation meant that prices increased drastically, even for non-imported items (Newbury, 1995).

Kimanuka, (2009) states that the war that began in 1990 and ended in 1994 destroyed the vital macro-economic and institutional infrastructure necessary for the successful and balanced growth of a modern, market based economy. Banks were shut down a significant amount of the money supply was taken out of circulation to refugee camps and the administrative capacity of the government was obliterated. The 1994 genocide marked an important watershed in the history of a country that experienced episodes of violence and centralization in the decision making process. The 1994 genocide destroyed Rwanda’s fragile economic base, along with a large share of its human capital, while wiping out its ability to attract private investment (IDA,2009). Evidently it became hard for Rwanda to find an economic balance with the war in progress.

***Somalia:***

Somalia is a small state in the Horn of Africa, the country is considered extremely poor according to world standards, the Somali people, who are largely homogeneous, have a long history and rich language. Somali people continue to be resilient in the face of economic poverty and civil wars that have been so much a part of their history. Many authors classify Somalia as an independent and proud people who maintain a living from sparse resources (Little, 2003).

Somalia’s history has been marked by long periods of dictatorship and instability. Somalia democratically elected its first president in 1960 but less than a decade later, Major General Mohamed Siyad Barre’s regime overthrew the government and imposed a dictatorship that lasted until 1991., when armed opposition groups drove Barre out of power and caused the collapse of the central government. The absence of the central government, combined with the impact of droughts, contributed to a series of humanitarian crises during the 1990s (GAO, 2008). In absence of a national government, Somalia has struggled to remain unified.

The Somali state was at its zenith in the immediate aftermath of the 1969 coup, when Siyad’s new revolutionary government mobilized Somali society in pursuit of nationalist and modernizing ideals. The idea of Somalia transcended clan and was associated with the unification of the Somali peoples, Somali statehood was also linked with ambitious modernizing, including the adoption of a script for the Somali language and an accelerated effort to promote literacy. Siyad had well established strategies for staying in power he abolished the system whereby traders could use their foreign currency held abroad to buy and import goods (franco valuta) and squeezed the livestock export trade but this did not work. Other strategies he may have tried would have been setting up his own shadow foreign exchange system parallel to the official one to fund his own political budget or authorizing Islamic banking. Somalia was a middle income country but its ruler had a low income political budget. In these circumstances, licensing corruption and military entrepreneurism did not buy loyalty but instead enabled his rivals to tap the money in the informal economy for their own political purposes (De Waal, 2015).

Corruption also hampered growth where business people who owned firms in Mogadishu explained that before the fall of the state, it was extremely difficult to get import-export permits, thus limiting business opportunities to a handful of elites. These obstructions had a devastating impact on the national economy. Increased repression of domestic uprisings from both the north and the south also increased defense spending at an unsustainable rate. Political repression of rival clan groups, coupled with a devastating economic crisis, created a perfect storm for violent rebellion against the state (Ahmad,2012). Loans for agricultural development became a mechanism for land grabbing, as government officials and military officers got land title by paying bribes at the relevant offices, often without even having seen the land in question and then used for consumption or trade. Thousands of farmers many form disadvantaged minority clans were robbed of their land and livelihood (De Waal, 2015).

On the other hand, Little (2003) argues that Somalia was once a country of strong, symbiotic relations between town and countryside. Nomads and townsfolk moved fluidly between rural and urban sectors whereas urbanites maintained livestock herds with rural clansmen. The boundaries between the two sectors were blurred and complementary goods and information passed readily across the cultural divide between town and country. While this may have been the case in the recent past, it clearly does not reflect the reality of the contemporary Somalia where cities have become isolated pockets of violence and decline. As livestock became the major source of revenue for the state, the socio-economic functions of pastoralism shifted from supporting producers to supporting the state and merchants. As the revenues from the livestock trade were appropriated by a small number of trading families and the state, new equalities of wealth between pastoralists, merchants and the state emerged (Bradbury, 2008).

Before the western colonization of Somalia in the late 1800s, the Somali culture and Islam were the primary sources of knowledge for most Somalis. Terrorism, piracy and humanitarian catastrophe have been associated with this poor nation and Somalia is now increasingly in the news and the subject of political discussion support operations. (Elimi, 2010).

**4. PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT**

***Rwanda development after genocide:***

Prior to 1994, Rwanda enjoyed substantial flows of external aid. Official development assistance grew from US $35 million between 1971 and 1974 to US $343 million between 1990 and 1993. The approach to economic development, however lacked a focus on people, the good early performance of the economy could not be sustained, poverty increased and violence escalated by 1994, Rwanda’s GDP had fallen by 50 percent causing majority of the economic sectors to collapse (Kimanuka, 2009). Rwanda has achieved impressive progress since the 1994 genocide that killed approximately one million people. The country moved to rehabilitate devastated infrastructure and restore social norms and has embarked on an ambitious development strategy seeking to transform the country from a low income, agriculture based economy to a knowledge based service economy (IDA,2009).

The government of Rwanda has adopted a comprehensive policy framework to guide its own strategic decisions and those of the donors as they worked toward Rwanda’s development, especially poverty reduction (Kimanuka, 2009). Rwanda shows a good example that once services are for the people and offered to her people then a state can thrive.

The years between 2000 and 2001 marked a significant milestone in the history of post genocide Rwanda. Rwanda had been classified as a conflict status country from the early 90’s until 1998 when the country made significant transition from emergency to sustainable development. Rwanda has since the genocide embarked on an ambitious public sector reform program known as “Rwanda Public Sector transformation and reconfiguration,” which falls under the country’s current socioeconomic, political and administrative reforms and is to be realized in the context of the country’s dynamics of good governance, whose aim is to deliver quality public service for sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction (Kimanuka, 2009).

The following years saw the government successfully implement a broad range of programs of economic reforms, focusing on the exchange and trade regime, privatization of state owned enterprises, reform of public administration and private sector development (Kimanuka, 2009). This period constituted a transition from war to peace and from the old order in which the style of managing public affairs changed to involving citizens in matters that affect their day to day livelihood. The Government of Rwanda has sought national unity and reconciliation by implementing policies and laws aimed at entirely eliminating distinctions among ethnic groups. Therefore, the Government of Rwanda refuses to recognize the existence of minority and indigenous groups in Rwanda (Abimbola & Dominic, 2013).

Kimanuka (2009) states that the lack of accountability, unethical behavior and corrupt practices, coupled with institutionalized norms of behavior in Africa have become so pervasive that one may confidently speak of a crisis of ethics in African public services. For example, bribery the obvious impact of such practices on productivity becomes inadequate. However, this cannot necessarily be said about Rwanda there is little to zero tolerance to corruption the money is used for its sole purpose and those known for per taking in this act will suffer the consequences. Kabaaj, (2002) agrees and argues that corruption is a ubiquitous problem confronting governance throughout history. It can be found in almost every society and political system around the globe. Yet for poor countries that face an acute scarcity of development resources, corruption can become a major hindrance to their economic growth. As reported across the continent everywhere, corruption is most rampant in conditions where levels of accountability are low and when governance institutions are weak. In these conditions holders of public office do not have an obligation to be transparent in the decisions and actions they take or to submit themselves to scrutiny.

The unbridled dissemination of hate information on radio in Rwanda manifested in form spreading ethnic hatred and inciting ethnocide and genocide in newspapers and magazines to convince the Hutu population that they were being pummeled from outside and within by the Tutsi infiltrators and the Hutu supporters of democracy (Abimbola & Dominic, 2013). Therefore, in the new spirit of reconciliation and re-integration, ethnic identification is played down against national identity. All citizens of Rwanda are Rwandans.

***Development in Somalia:***

Somalia on the other hand currently has a population of about 8.8 million, according to state of which roughly 1 million are considered internally displaced, having been forced or obliged to leave their homes to avoid conflict without crossing an internationally recognized border. While Somalia today is stateless, it is not anarchic. Although repeated efforts to revive a central government have failed, local communities have responded with a range of strategies to establish the minimal essential elements of governance. What has emerged in Somalia are fluid, localized polities involving authorities as diverse as clan elders, professionals, militia leaders, businessmen, women associations and Islamic fundamentalists (Little,2003).

Somalia since its origin is a very hostile natural habitat with scarcities of water and abundance of sandy and infertile land and repeated droughts. The Somali people have faced several political turmoils, external invasions, wars and coups. All these circumstances and events have left their mark on the character of the Somali people, who have been basically nomadic pastoral people for thousands of years (Shay, 2011). Livestock has been and remains central to the economy of Somalia and its people yet cattle continue to die of disease by the thousands in the absence of veterinary services and medicines. A program should be implemented to vaccinate cattle primarily against rinderpest and establish quarantine centers in major trading ports as this is an effort to eradicate disease among cattle as a step towards revitalizing existing herds and trade in livestock (Sahnoun, 1994).

History and population patterns in the area are greatly affected by climatic factors, drought is the main risk and a normal occurrence in the region as it is throughout the Horn of Africa. Localized droughts are very common in the borderlands, forcing herders to adjust grazing patterns every three to four years regardless of political conditions. Regardless of conflicts and politics, pastoralism is strongly affected by seasonality. This is a simple reality of trying to make a living in a dry region where seasonal mobility is the key, this has consequently affected agriculture. Beyond the images of chaos and warfare that still shape outside perceptions of Somalia, hundreds of thousands of herders and traders effectively produce and trade Somalia’s most valuable commodity, livestock. The Somalia based on arms and urban warlords is markedly different than the Somalia based on livestock and skilled herders and traders. As an activity, livestock based commerce is at the heart of Somali livelihoods and social relationships. Flexibility and persistence are also words that embody similar attributes and capture what has happened in Somali and other communities of rural Africa that have survived daunting challenges. Wars, famines, collapsed governments and epidemics are among the catastrophes that Africans have confronted in the past decade (Little,2003).

In the economic arena, boundary issues are even more complicated because borders between official and unofficial economic activity have always been problematic, even prior to the government’s collapse. The Somalia economy is not fully acknowledged by global bodies like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund although it officially exports bananas and livestock products and has had foreign investment and trade (Little, 2003). With its obelisk shaped geography accounting for one of Africa’s largest coastlines and with vast international borders, Somalia poses particular problems for those who might wish to control its trade, either in livestock or contraband goods (Little, 2003).

Although Somalia has known several periods of unrest since its independence in 1960, the first serious was an uprising in the North in 1988 that ultimately led to the disintegration of the country. The uprising was fueled both by clan-based rivalries and by political and economic considerations. The northern region produced surplus livestock that accounted for the largest share of Somali export earnings. The northerners felt a sense of injustice because the resources of the region were not benefiting them primarily and because there was no equitable regional economic development and also frustrated that they were unable to maintain close relations with the populations across the border in Ethiopia and Djibouti (Sahnoun, 1994).

In the past two decades, Somalia has twice caught the attention of foreign governments concerned with the threat that ‘fragile’ and ‘failing states’ are thought to pose to international security. In the early 1990s, the humanitarian crisis in Somalia provoked an unprecedented military-backed humanitarian intervention aimed at ending famine and restoring a state. A decade later, concerns focused on the potential threat that this ‘ungoverned space’ posed as a haven or incubator of transnational terrorism and criminality (Bradbury,2008). In May 1991, northwestern Somalia unilaterally declared independence as the Republic of Somaliland. Somaliland’s claim to independence as a sovereign state has not gained international recognition. Puntland formed in 1998 was formed as an autonomous, self-governing entity. Unlike south- central region Somaliland and Puntland have managed to limit violence, establish democratic systems and institutions and provide basic services. This division has caused the whole state into disillusionment, there is no coordination and these states are seen as creating better living conditions for her people.

The ongoing Somalia conflict has affected Somalia in three major ways, first and foremost is Somalia’s economic system Somalia experiences unregulated market that benefits a few people while it oppresses the majority. Many Somalis have no jobs despite being active and able to engage in the production process. In fact, many families rely on the remittances and support from their relatives who are in other countries, besides high rates of unemployment the health services are so poor and enrolment in school by young children is very low, this creates a favorable environment for conflict to escalate. The war in Somalia has caused some spill-over consequences to its neighboring states as well as to the wider international community. This is in ways such as the rise of terrorism, increase of refugees, piracy activities, smuggling of goods, as well as circulation of small arms and right weapons. This has been a great concern of the international community for the past twenty-five years (Abdi, 2017).

In a country which has become a by-word for seemingly endless political disorder and humanitarian crises, an analysis of ‘peace dynamics’ rather than ‘conflict dynamics’ reveals a society adapting to state collapse, managing conflict, and establishing systems of governance. The Somali region, as several analysts have observed, is not simply a lawless and ungoverned land but one where communities have forged a variety of systems to provide security and law and order and to facilitate economic activity (Bradbury,2008). For over two decades, Somalis and the international community have struggled to find ways to manage, contain, and ultimately resolve the political crisis in the Somali region. This has involved two distinct and often contrary approaches to conflict resolution and state building, often distinguished simplistically as ‘top down’ internationally driven processes, and ‘bottom-up’ or ‘grassroots’ Somali-led process. For decades international diplomatic, military and development interventions have failed to resolve the political crisis in Somalia and to deliver security and a functional national government that has broad local acceptance.

In addition to peace keeping efforts, the international community is implementing other programs to improve the security solution in Somalia, including security sector reform and conflict mitigation. For example, the United Nations Development Program(UNDP) implements programs aimed at contributing to Somali efforts to restore a peaceful and secure environment that will promote social and economic recovery. The lack of effective government institutions, particularly in South-Central Somalia, further hampers the implementation of humanitarian activities. The Transitional Federal Government lacks the capacity to coordinate humanitarian aid in Somalia. For example, in 2007, the Transitional Federal Government imposed restrictions on the delivery of humanitarian aid. Somalia, donors including the United States, the United Nations and the World Bank affirmed that the scope and effectiveness of their development assistance are contingent on reasonable stability in operating areas and genuine attempts at good governance at the country’s federal, regional and local levels (GAO, 2008).

**5. THEORIES**

According to Davis and Baran (2009) the media dependency theory assumes that the more a person depends on having his or her needs met by media use, the more important will the role that media plays in the person’s life and therefore the more influence that media will have on that person. Proponents Melvin DeFleur and Sandra Ball-Rokeach in 1975 state that the basis of media influence lies in the relationship between the larger social system, the media’s role in that system and audience relationships to the media. Effects occur not because all powerful media or omnipotent sources compel that occurrence but because the media operate in a given way in a given social system to meet given audience and wants. In the early 1990s during the peace process in Sanaag region, the BBC Somali Service was used to inform and enhance public awareness of the accords. Since then, the development of technologies for recording, reporting, and disseminating information has given the media an increasingly normative role in peace processes. Peace accords that in the past would not even have been written down are now recorded on audio and film, providing historical records that can be referred to (beyond the memory of senior elders). Through radio, television and the internet, details of the proceedings and accords can be widely disseminated within the region and abroad improving public knowledge.

In support of the above assertion, (Kimanuka 2009), states that another instrument of public transparency and accountability is the press. However, in the case of Rwanda, the press exacerbated tensions among the people through inflammatory print and media. The Radio Television Mille Collines which was the most prominent during the genocide urged on the killings, broadcasting names of Tutsi and opposition targets, and reporting the whereabouts of those hiding from militias during the genocide. The killing squads (interahamwe) were thus often able to discover people who were hidden with relatives or neighbors, through reports on the radio (Abimbola & Dominic, 2013).

As Russell Smith points out, “the so-called hate media had a significant part to play in the genocide”. Today the government and media organizations have been working together to create a press that can play the positive role of educating and informing the public thus serving as the public’s watch dog. Public debates on Issues of national concern are held on television, radio and newspapers which has helped the press revamp her image. Furthermore, (Bourgault, 1995) states that after the genocide, Rwanda’s plans to introduce a television service in the near future were interrupted by the ghastly civil war, it definitely took a while for Rwanda to accept media but it is known that the media is still monitored by the government.

**6. CONCLUSION**

There is a lot various scholars can attribute to the growth of Rwanda after genocide but this says a lot about the country’s leadership, President Kagame has shown with determination and loyalty to her people a country can grow, of course Rwanda is known not to fully exercise democracy leaving her political setting in question but there is no denial that the President has shown his service to her people. In addition, the performance contracts for the local governments that have been put in place have held persons in charge accountable for service delivery in the different communities all of which is monitored by the President. Somalia on the other hand seems to be comfortable and has the potential to grow but with no co-ordination among the states there stands to be no chance of development and peace.

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